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Modular Verification of Timed Circuits Using
Automatic Abstraction
Hao Zheng, Eric Mercer, Member, IEEE, and Chris Myers, Member, IEEE

Abstract—The major barrier that prevents the application of
formal verification to large designs is state explosion. This paper
presents a new approach for verification of timed circuits using
automatic abstraction. This approach partitions the design into
modules, each with constrained complexity. Before verification is
applied to each individual module, irrelevant information to the
behavior of the selected module is abstracted away. This approach
converts a verification problem with big exponential complexity to
a set of subproblems, each with small exponential complexity. Experimental results are promising in that they indicate that our approach has the potential of completing much faster while using less
memory than traditional flat analysis.
Index Terms—Abstraction, modular verification, timed circuits.

I. INTRODUCTION

I

N ORDER to continue to produce circuits of increasing
speed, designers are considering aggressive circuit styles
such as self-resetting or delayed-reset domino circuits. These
circuit styles can achieve a significant improvement in circuit
speed as demonstrated by their use in a gigahertz research
microprocessor (guTS) at IBM [1]. Designers are also considering asynchronous circuits due to their potential for higher
performance and lower power consumption as demonstrated
by the RAPPID instruction length decoder designed at Intel
[2]. This design was three times faster while using only half
the power of the synchronous design. The correctness of these
new timed circuit styles is highly dependent upon their timing
parameters, so extensive timing verification is necessary during
the design process. Unfortunately, these new circuit styles
cannot be efficiently and accurately verified using traditional
static timing analysis methods. This lack of efficient analysis
tools is one of the reasons for the lack of mainstream acceptance
of these circuit styles.
In [3], a hierarchical approach to verification based on trace
theory is proposed for the analysis of speed-independent circuits. In this approach, a model of a circuit at one level is regarded as the implementation of the model at the higher level
and as the specification of the model at the lower level. The
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model at the higher level is more abstract and has fewer implementation details. A circuit is a correct implementation if it
conforms to its specification. Trace theory has proved to be an
excellent model for verifying circuits, and it is trace theory that
this paper utilizes to justify its approach.
In [4] and [5], trace theory is extended with a representation
where time is modeled as multiples of a discretization constant.
Unfortunately, the state space explodes if the delay ranges are
large and the discretization constant is set small enough to ensure exact exploration of the state space. In [6], timed automata
are introduced to model the behavior of real-time systems. It
provides a simple and general way to annotate state-transition
graphs with timing constraints using a finite number of realvalued clocks. Although this approach eliminates the need to
discretize time, the number of timed states is dependent on the
size of the delay ranges and the number of concurrently enabled clocks which can quickly explode for even relatively small
systems. Representing possible clock values with convex polygons, or zones, [7] alleviates this problem in practice. The zone
based representation is the one used by most modern timing verifiers such as ATACS [8]–[10], VINAS-P [11], ORBITS [12],
[13], KRONOS [14], and UPPAAL [15]. One feature common
to these tools is that they require state space exploration which
can explode even for modest size examples.
There do exist many methods and approaches to address the
state explosion problem. In [16] and [17], the state space of a
transition system is represented symbolically using Bryant’s
ordered binary decision diagram [18]. The symbolic approach
has been shown to be capable of representing systems with
states. There has been some success at the
more than
verification of timed systems using binary decision diagrams
[19], [20]. Asynchronous systems consist of concurrent processes without a global synchronizing clock. State explosion is
particularly serious for asynchronous systems because all possible interleavings among concurrently executed events need
to be explored. A number of techniques have been proposed
to minimize the number of interleavings that are explored,
including stubborn sets [21], partial orders [22], and unfoldings
[23]. There has also been some success at applying partial
orders to formal timing verification [11], [24]. Although the
approaches described above have been successful in verifying
systems with increased sizes, many realistic systems are still
too large to be handled.
In practice, circuits often have inherent modular structures.
Compositional verification methods based on assume-guarantee reasoning [25]–[27], exploit the modular structure of
circuits. Verifying a circuit component in this approach necessitates behavioral assumptions on connecting components to
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reduce complexity in the model. The assumptions must later
be discharged as part of the correctness proof for connecting
the components. Our approach is similar to assume-guarantee
reasoning, only it does not necessitate behavioral assumptions
on the connecting components. In our approach, their complexities are automatically abstracted through semantics-preserving
transformations; thus, we do not generate additional proof
obligations for the components.
Abstraction is essential to reasoning about circuits with datapath components. It reduces model complexity by generalizing
the actual data values into a reduced set of less detail that preserves key properties in the original set. This mitigates state explosion in the model. The properties that need to be preserved
depend on the verification problem, but the problem is often
much simpler to solve through the abstracted model. Examples
of effective abstraction methods are seen in [28] and [29]. These
methods, however, do not address real-time systems such as
timed circuits. In [9], hand abstraction is used to verify timed
synchronous domino circuits from [1]. Although hand abstraction is extremely effective in verifying these circuits, it requires
an expert user and necessitates other methods to validate the abstracted circuit as a reliable model of the actual circuit.
This paper presents an automatic abstraction method that
combines the ideas of compositional reasoning with abstraction to avoid additional proof obligations in the verification
problem. This paper applies the approach to timed Petri-net
models of timed circuits to demonstrate its effectiveness. We
examine timed circuits because of their inherent modular
structure which is ideal for modular verification. The automatic
abstraction method verifies each circuit component individually
by reducing model complexity through semantics-preserving
transformations applied to the connecting components. The
transformations remove model details in the connecting components that do not affect the correctness of the component
of interest. We prove in this approach that under certain
constraints, if each component is verified correct using the
semantics-preserving transformations in the connecting fabric,
then the complete system is also correct. To show the effectiveness of this approach, this paper presents case studies on a FIFO
from SUN Microsystems, the STARI communication circuit,
and the RAPPID instruction length decoder. These studies
suggest that taking advantage of the structural information in
this way reduces the verification cost of timed circuits. It also
needs to be pointed out that our method is not constrained to
a particular state space search algorithm since it modifies the
specification before analysis. In other words, our abstraction
technique is complimentary to methods that utilize BDDs or
partial orders.
This paper is organized as follows. The next two sections introduce the definitions and semantics of timed Petri-nets. Section IV gives a brief overview of trace structures and introduces
basic operations in trace theory that are necessary to prove our
modular verification theory. Section V introduces safe abstraction and safe transformations, and gives the conditions that must
be satisfied when removing information from a model without
reducing the essential properties. Section VI describes several
safe transformations to remove the irrelevant information from
a model. These transformations are proved to be safe based on
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the conditions given in Section V. Section VII develops the modular verification theory and proves its correctness. Section VIII
gives results of applying our approach to several case studies.
This paper concludes with a discussion of the future research
that can improve this approach.

II. TIMED PETRI-NETS: DEFINITIONS
Our method uses timed Petri nets [30] to model timed circuits.
This section introduces basic definitions of timed Petri nets. The
next section presents their semantics.
Let be a finite set of wires in a timed circuit. The timed behavior of a circuit is modeled as sequences of rising and falling
,
is a rising transition and
transitions on . For any
is a falling transition on the wire . In the following defiand
denote the sets of nonnegative rational
nitions, let
and nonnegative real numbers, respectively.
-labeled one-safe timed Petri net
Definition 2.1: A
(TPN) is a directed bipartite digraph described by the tuple
where
is the set of transitions;
•
is the set of places;
•
is the flow relation;
•
is the initial marking;
•
is the lower bound function;
•
is the upper bound function;
•
is the set of constraint places;
•
is the labeling function.
•
The first four members of the eight tuple define the structure
and initial marking of the Petri net. The functions and define
a lower and upper bound for when tokens can be consumed by
transitions. is used to specify safety and bounded response
time properties that must hold in the circuit. Constraint places
define ordering requirements and bounded response properties
between two arbitrary transitions in a TPN. An error occurs
when a transition can fire according to the marking and age of
tokens in its ordinary places in while violating the additional
constraints implied by the places in . The function maps
transitions in a TPN to transitions on wires in . The symbol $
denotes the abstracted transitions. These do not affect the state
and are place holders for timing information
of any wires in
from abstracted signals.
The STARI circuit [31] is used to illustrate our modeling approach. The STARI circuit enables communication between two
circuits that are operating at the same clock frequency but are
out-of-phase due to clock skew. Clock skew can make it appear
that one of the circuits operates faster than the other. The STARI
protocol puts more data into a FIFO when the transmitter works
faster than the receiver and supplies data from a FIFO to the
receiver when the receiver works faster. The STARI circuit is
a common timed circuit benchmark, since its correctness depends on timing assumptions. Fig. 1 shows the block diagram
of a STARI circuit with two stages.
The functionality of the STARI circuit is described as follows. At the beginning of each clock period, one data is inserted
into the FIFO by the transmitter (TX) by setting either x0.t or
x0.f high. At the same time, one data is removed by the receiver
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Fig. 1.
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Block diagram for a two-stage STARI circuit.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 2. (a) TPN for the global clock module. (b) The TPN for the TX module.
(c) The TPN for the RX module.

(RX) by setting ack3 low. Data is allowed to propagate asynchronously down the FIFO queue. When clk goes low, TX removes the input data by resetting x0.t or x0.f and RX removes
the acknowledgment by setting ack3 high.
The STARI circuit is modeled in our approach through a collection of TPNs. The TPN for the global clock from the STARI
circuit is shown in Fig. 2(a). The labeled transitions from are
shown instead of the members of to clarify the figures. Note
that the places are not shown either. Although places do exist on
every edge, they are omitted whenever possible to simplify the
figures. The model in Fig. 2(a) toggles the clock with a fixed
period of 12 time units. The TPN model for TX is shown in
Fig. 2(b). When TX sees the transition clk+, it nondeterministically produces either x0.t+ or x0.f+. This is the dual-rail encoded
data that is sent to Stage1. The delay interval [0, 1] is used to
model the clock skew. After transmitting the data, TX waits for
a clk–. It then fires either the x0.t– or x0.f– transition depending
on what it transmitted. It fires this transition in the [0, 1] delay
interval. The TPN for RX is shown in Fig. 2(c). RX waits for
clk+ and then lowers ack3 to indicate that it has received the
data. After clk–, it raises ack3 to request new data. Again, the
delay interval [0, 1] is used to model clock skew.
The TPN for Stage1 of the STARI circuit is presented in
Fig. 3(a). The place with dotted arcs is a constraint place and
can be ignored for the moment. This stage does not currently
have any data, and its ack1 output is high. It waits for either
x0.t+ or x0.f+ to indicate valid data and ack2+ to indicate that
Stage2 is empty and ready to receive data. It then fires x1.t+ or
x1.f+ to pass the data to Stage2. After firing one of these two
transitions, it fires ack1– to indicate to TX that it has successfully received the data. At this point, it waits for either x0.t– or
x0.f– and ack2– from Stage2 to indicate that it has accepted the
data. It then resets its data output by firing either x1.t– or x1.f–
depending on the data it transmitted. After firing one of these
transitions, it fires ack1+ to request new data. The TPN model

(a) TPN for Stage1. (b) TPN for Stage2.

for Stage2, shown in Fig. 3(b), is similar to Stage1. The only
difference is that Stage2 starts in a different state because it is
initialized with a data item.
There are two safety properties in STARI that need to be verified. First, each data output by TX must be inserted into the
FIFO before TX sends another data and, second, a new data must
be output by the FIFO before each acknowledgment from the receiver [27]. Such properties are checked by places in . These
are often derived from the circuit’s specification. Connecting
two transitions with a constraint place creates an ordering and
bounded response time property that must hold between the two
transitions in any run of the system; thus, a place in is different
from a place in in that it does not affect the firing of a transition. Arcs from constraint places are noncausal. Only places in
are considered when firing a transition. Once a transition is selected to fire, the places in are checked to make sure that firing
that transition does not violate ordering and timing requirements
defined in the specification. In a TPN, constraint places are indicated with dotted edges into and out of the places. To model the
first property, a constraint place is added to the TPN for Stage1
in Fig. 3(a). A constraint violation occurs whenever TX fires
x0.t+ or x0.f+ before Stage1 fires ack1+. A constraint violation
also occurs whenever TX fires x0.t+ or x0.f+ after ack1+, but
the age of the constraint place in the marking is less than 3 (i.e.,
one of the transitions fired too early). The second property is
checked in a similar way in Stage2, as shown in Fig. 3(b), except it requires a bounded response time by ack3–. The firing of
either x2.t+ or x2.f+ can add the constraint place to the marking.
Its age in the marking must not fall outside the [9], [13] delay
bound before ack3– fires in a correct STARI implementation. In
order to satisfy this property, however, the FIFO must be initialized to be half full [31]. This is why Stage2 initially contains a
data item.
A timed-circuit specification is often a collection of TPNs,
as illustrated in the STARI example. Each TPN defines the behavior of a module. The parallel composition of a collection
is the single TPN
of TPN’s
that is the union over the constituent members of each ; thus,
,
,
, etc. Fig. 4 shows
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Fig. 4. TPN for the entire two stage STARI circuit.

the parallel composition of the global clock, TX, RX, and the
FIFO stages shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
III. TIMED PETRI-NETS : SEMANTICS
The states of Petri nets are associated with their markings,
, which is the set of places that hold tokens. Our method assumes that correct nets are one-safe so places can only hold a
, its associated preset
single token.1 With every transition
. The place-set of a transition is
is
the restriction of places in its preset to ordinary (not constraint)
. The postset of a transition is the set
places, i.e.,
,
of places that the transition feeds into. For a transition
. A transition is enthis is defined as
abled in a state if the members of its place-set form a subset of
the places in the marking of the state.
Definition 3.1: The transition is enabled in a marking
if
. The set of transitions enabled in
is denoted by
.
The state of a TPN contains, beside the marking, timing information associated with each place, i.e., its age, the time since its
)
last addition to the marking. The state of a TPN is a pair (
is the current marking and
is a clock aswhere
signment function assigning positive reals to places. For every
is the value of a clock associated with
place , the value
denoting its age. There are two operations on clocks: advance
,
and reset. For some nonnegative real number
advances the clock for every
to the value
.
,
resets the clock
For some subset of places
for every place in to zero and agrees with for every place
1As described later, our analysis method checks for violations of the one-safe
property during analysis, and when such a violation is detected, a failure is reported and analysis ceases.
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in
. The initial clock assignment,
, for the system is
defined such that the clock for every place is zero. The initial
is given by the pair
state of the TPN
).
(
The state of a TPN can change by firing a transition or ad), in addition to
vancing time. To fire a transition at (
being enabled,
must satisfy the timing constraints in and
. A transition is time-enabled if two conditions are met: first,
the clock for each place in its place-set is above its lower timing
bound; and second, there exists a clock for a place in its place-set
that is below its upper timing bound. These two conditions are
formalized in Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.2: An enabled transition, , is time-enabled in
) if for all
,
; and there exthe state (
such that
.
ists a place
These semantics allow some places to exceed their upper
bound while requiring all places to meet their lower bound before a transition fires. Causality is not strictly determined by the
order of arrival of the tokens in the preset of a transition unless
all places in the preset have identical bounds. Rather, it is determined by the age of the tokens in the preset and their respective
bounds. Although a token in a preset does not arrive last, if it has
a sufficient delay bound it can determine the latest firing time
)
of the transition. Firing a time-enabled transition from (
) denoted by
,
creates the new state (
and
.
where
The state of the TPN can change not only by firing transitions,
but also by advancing time. Advancing time only affects the
clock assignment function in the state pair. Advancing time by a
in (
) creates a new state (
), denoted by
delay
, where
. Time cannot advance
indefinitely in a state but only by an amount that does not disable
a time-enabled transition.
that can adDefinition 3.3: The maximum delay
) is
vance at a state (

After advancing time by the maximum delay, a transition either remains nontimed-enabled, becomes time-enabled, or is already time-enabled and remains so.
Consider again the TPN shown in Fig. 2(a). In the initial
marking, the only enabled transition is clk+ which fires after
time is advanced by 12 time units. This enables clk– which fires
after another 12 time units have advanced. Consider now the
TPN shown in Fig. 2(b). Since clk+ has no places in its preset,
it can fire at any time. After clk+ fires, either x0.t+ or x0.f+ can
fire or time can advance by up to 1 time unit. The TPN’s in this
figure describe only part of the behavior of the STARI circuit.
Let us now consider the composite TPN shown in Fig. 4. In
the initial marking, clk+ is the only enabled transition which
fires after time is advanced by 12 units. The firing of clk+ results in a marking where there are four enabled transitions clk–,
x0.t+, x0.f+, and ack3–. Since the lower bound of the timing
constraint on x0.t+, x0.f+, and ack3– is zero, these transitions
can fire immediately, and time cannot advance more than one
time unit before one of them is forced to fire. Note that since
clk– must wait at least 12 time units, it cannot fire first. Assume
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that x0.t+ fires first. This firing disables x0.f+ as it consumes the
token in their shared place.
Let be a TPN. A trace of is a sequence of transition-time
pairs, ( ), such that the transitions and their labels are taken
from . The time, , is a time stamp reference from the beginning of the trace. The amount of time elapsed between any two
and , in the trace can be computed
consecutive entries,
and . In the case of the first entry in
from the values of
. A trace is valid in if starting from the inithe trace,
tial state pair of , advancing time by the specified delay in the
trace and then firing the transition leads to a state pair where the
next time advance and transition firing in the trace can occur.
This is expressed in Definition 3.4.
)
Definition 3.4: The trace (
is a valid trace if there exists a sequence of states
such that for
each
and
,
1)
2)
3)
4)

;
is time-enabled in

The set of all possible traces for a TPN
) is denoted by
.
state (

;
starting from an initial

implies that every
A set of traces is prefix-closed if
of valid traces is prefix-closed
prefix of is in . The set
by definition. A trace is monotonic if time can only advance in
the forward direction. A valid trace is also monotonic by definition.
The set of possible traces in a TPN can be divided into those
that are considered successes and those that are considered failures. There are three types of failure modeled in the TPN: safety;
, is the
constraint; and complement. The state-set of a trace
sequence of states created by the trace starting from the initial
state of the TPN. A valid trace of a TPN is a safety failure if
in firing the trace the marking update tries to add to the new
marking a place that already exists in the current marking. This
is formalized in Definition 3.5.
Definition 3.5: The valid trace
generates a safety failure if given its state sequence
there exists a state
and transition-time pair (
) where
.
Consider again the TPN shown in Fig. 4. If timing is ignored, then from the initial marking clk+ could fire followed by
clk– and clk+ again. In computing the new marking from firing
clk+, a place is added to the marking that already exists in the
marking. This is a safety failure. The place is part of the preset
for transitions x0.t+ and x0.f+, and it persists in the marking until
one of these two transitions fire. Any trace that does not separate consecutive clk+ transitions with intervening x0.t+ or x0.f+
transitions is a safety failure.
A valid trace is a constraint failure if it contains a transition or
time progress that could not have occurred if constraints places
are taken into account in the definition of enabledness.
Definition 3.6: The valid trace
generates a constraint failure if given its corresponding
, there exists a state
state sequence

and delay,
of the three following conditions hold:

, such that one
that satisfies

1) there exists a constraint place
; or
2) there exists a constraint place
.
3)

that satisfies

There are three failure conditions corresponding to constraint
places. The first type of failure occurs when a transition having
a constraint place in its preset is taken while the constraint place
is not marked or has not been marked long enough. The second
type occurs when a token stays in a constraint place beyond its
upper bound. The third type occurs when a trace deadlocks with
constraint places still marked.
To further illustrate the role of constraint places, recall that
there are two properties in STARI that need to be verified: first,
each data output by TX must be inserted into the FIFO before
TX sends another data and, second, a new data must be output
by the FIFO before each acknowledgment from RX. The bounds
on the two constraint places refine these properties with the following information: first, TX must separate data by at least three
time units and, second, a new data must be output by the FIFO
at least nine and no more than 13 time units before the acknowledgment from RX. The constraints enable the specification of
the bounded response time properties necessary to interface the
STARI circuit with the two skewed clock domains without introducing race conditions or setup and hold time violations. The
constraint is violated, however, if the bound is changed to [10]
and [12]. In this case, ack3– can fire as early as nine time units
after x2.t+ or x2.f+ by the observation that its constraint place
can be marked as late as three time units after clk–, and clk+ is
forced to fire in another nine time units. Transition ack3– can
also fire as late as 13 time units after x2.t+ or x2.f+ in the initial
marking by the observation that clk+ fires 12 time units after
clk–, and ack3– can fire one time unit later. Constraints can be
systematically derived from the functional specification of the
system and iteratively checked as the model is refined with implementation detail.
A valid trace is a complement failure if there exists in the trace
a transition-time pair that fires a rising or falling transition on a
signal that is already in a high or low Boolean state, respectively.
This is formalized in Definition 3.7.
Definition 3.7: The valid trace
generates a complement failure if there exists two pairs (
)
) such the following three conditions hold:
and (
;
1)
;
2)
3) for all transition-time pairs (
,(
).

) such that
), and (

,

in the trace.
The first condition forces to occur before
The second condition forces to be the same transition as on
the same wire in , and the last condition forces that is the
first instance of a transition identical to without an intervening
opposite transition; thus, a complement failure trace fires the
same transition at least two times in a row without first toggling
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the signal to its opposite Boolean state. Consider the TPN shown
in Fig. 2(b). Since there are no places in the preset of clk+, it
can fire at any time. Therefore, a possible trace for this TPN is
((clk+,1),(clk+,2)). This trace is, however, a failure since clk+
has occurred two times in a row without an intervening clk-.
again be a TPN and
be a set of valid
Let
returns the traces in that are
traces in . The function
either safety, constraint, or complement failures. The goal is to
through modular verification using
show that
abstraction because the entire reachable state space of is too
large to enumerate for a real design. The fail function must never
hide failure traces for this approach to work; thus, any definition
must satisfy the following property:
of
if

(1)

are two subsets of valid traces in
. It can
where and
that includes safety, constraint,
be shown that a definition of
and complement failures satisfies this condition.
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traces, they are naturally extended to timed traces in which the
timing portion of the trace is ignored.
The delete function
removes all events of a trace
whose transitions are in a set . More formally, if
(i.e., the empty trace), then
if
if
where

and
. If
, then
. It is extended naturally to sets of traces. The
, takes a set of transitions,
inverse delete function,
, and a set of traces, , and returns the set of traces which
if all events with transitions in
are deleted
would be in
). Intuitively, if
(i.e.,
is a trace not containing symbols from ,
is the
set of all traces that can be generated by inserting events in at
any time into . Some useful properties of these two functions
are [3], [36]

IV. BASIC TRACE THEORY
Trace-based models of concurrent processes were proposed
by Hoare [32], Milner [33], and others. Trace theory has since
been developed and applied to the verification of both speedindependent [3], [34] and timed circuits [11], [35]. Since the
dynamic behavior of a system can be described using the set of
possible timed traces it produces, it can also be modeled using a
timed trace structure. A timed trace structure is a four-tuple
where is the set of input transitions, is the set
of output transitions, is the set of successful traces, and is
the set of failure traces. This paper requires that the sets of input
).
is
and output transitions be disjoint (i.e.,
the alphabet of . The set of all possible timed traces is denoted
.
by , and
takes a TPN and returns its trace strucThe function
ture. This function creates a trace structure of the form

The input transitions are those that have been left unconstrained
(i.e., the only places in their preset are constraint places) while
the output transitions are all other transitions. Note that by con, then
struction, a trace structure is receptive (i.e., if
where is an input transition event is also in ). In other
words, a circuit cannot prevent the environment from causing
an input transition. The failure traces are those valid traces in
that are returned by the function
defined in the last
section, while the success traces are all the other possible traces.
. A trace structure is said
Note that by construction
.
to be failure-free if
The rest of this section gives a brief introduction to the basics
of trace theory, including basic operations on trace structures
and lemmas that are necessary to prove the lemma and theorems
in the following sections. More details can be found in [3]. Although all the definitions and proofs are proposed for untimed

(2)
when

(3)
(4)
(5)

that is used to make a set of tranA useful operation is
, internal to the circuit. Given a trace structure
sitions,
,
is defined as follow:

where
. Note that our definition of
is different from that in [3] in that errors on transitions in
can be hidden in our definition.
can be used to remove the
internal details of one module without affecting the correctness
of the module in which we are interested.
Composition ( ) combines two trace structures into a
single trace structure. Composition of two trace structures
and
is defined when
. To compose two trace structures, the alphabets
of both trace structures must first be made the same by adding
new inputs as necessary to each structure. Inverse delete is
extended to trace structures for this step as follows:

This is defined only when
. After the two alphabets
of the two structures are made to match, the trace structures are
intersected to find the traces that are consistent with the two
structures. The intersection of these two trace structures is defined as follows:

This is defined when
and
. A success trace
in the composite must be a success trace in both components. A
failure trace in the composite is a possible trace that is a failure
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trace in either component. The possible traces for the composite
. Composition can now be defined
are

An important property used in trace theory is conformance.
When a trace structure conforms to another trace structure
, it is safe to substitute the circuit modeled by whenever
is required. Conformance is defined
the circuit modeled by
as follows:
Definition 4.1: Given two trace structures, and , we say
conforms to
(denoted
) if
, and
is failure-free, so is
.
for all environments , if
cannot
Intuitively, if a system using a circuit modeled by
fail, neither can a system using a circuit modeled by .
Lemma 4.1 below gives a simple sufficient condition to determine conformance between two trace structures. The condition
assures that if the environment does not cause a failure
in , it does not cause a failure in . The condition
assures that if
does not cause a failure in the environment,
does not cause one, either. Lemma 4.2 shows that if conforms to , this conformance is maintained in any environment.
Proofs of these lemmas can be found in [3].
if
,
,
, and
Lemma 4.1:
.
and
is any trace structure, then
Lemma 4.2: If
.

Fig. 5. Composition of TPN’s for CLK, TX, RX, and Stage2 from the STARI
example to form the environment for Stage1.

Fig. 6.

Environment for Stage1 after abstracting internal transitions.

V. AUTOMATIC ABSTRACTION
In general, a large and complex design is organized as a
number of components, each of which has a well-defined
interface. In a system consisting of multiple components,
each component either connects to other components, the
environment, or both. Since the complexity of each component
is often much less than the whole system, it is desirable to
verify each component individually, and integrate the results
for all components when available to form the solution for the
whole system. If a component is chosen for verification, the
rest of the components and the system environment together
form the environment in which the selected component operates. To verify a component, only the interface behavior of
the environment is important to the component. Therefore, if
the internal behavior of the environment is abstracted away
while preserving its interface behavior, the environment can be
simplified to reduce the complexity of verification.
To apply abstraction to TPNs, first, a component is selected,
and then the TPNs for all other modules are composed together
to form the environment for the selected component. For the
STARI example, if Stage1 is selected, then the TPN for its environment is created by composing the TPN’s for the CLK, TX,
RX, and Stage2 as shown in Fig. 5.
In the second step, all internal signals of the environment relative to a chosen component are identified and transitions on
are called
them are placed in the set . The transitions in
the abstracted transitions. Our method also removes each constraint place that has abstracted signals in its preset and postset
and
, where
(i.e.,
), as well as each reference to it in the

flow relation (i.e.,
). Our
method also does not consider the abstracted transitions when
determining if there is a complement failure. They are, however,
still considered for safety failures.
Consider the environment for Stage1 shown in Fig. 5. If we
are verifying only the first stage of the two stage FIFO, then
the signals ack3, x2.t, x2.f, and clk are not on the interface of
the first FIFO stage and should be abstracted. Transitions on
these signals are marked as shown in Fig. 6, where the name of
each transition has been preceded by a ‘$’. The constraint place
between the transitions x2.t+ and x2.f+ and the transition ack3is also removed.
Simply removing these transitions from the definition of
does not substantially reduce the complexity of analysis since
the transitions still occur and cause changes in the marking.
Therefore, the third step to the abstraction process is to remove
these abstracted transitions and the related places whenever it
can be done safely. In other words, the TPN resulting from these
transformations must produce a superset of the timed traces produced by the original TPN when only the interface behavior is
considered. Such transformations are defined to be safe. The notions of safe abstraction and safe transformation are formally
defined as follows:
is a safe abDefinition 5.1 (Safe Abstraction): A TPN
where
straction of a TPN if
.
Definition 5.2 (Safe Transformation): A safe transformation
generates a
is a transformation that when applied to a TPN
that is a safe abstraction of .
new TPN
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Determining if a transformation is safe can be broken down
into two steps. First, a safe transformation must not reduce the
specified untimed behavior of the TPN. Second, the timing information carried by the TPN must be preserved in a conservathat takes a set
tive fashion. We define a function
of signal transitions and a TPN and removes transitions in
from using safe transformations, when possible.
Since safe transformations only add traces and adding traces
does not remove failures [see (1)], we know that this approach
never results in a false positive answer (i.e., a system verified
failure-free with the abstracted environment while verification
would detect failure traces in the system with the flat environment). However, verifying a system with a transformed environment may result in a false negative answer. A false negative
is when a failure trace is found while verifying a system with
the abstracted environment, but no failure traces are possible if
the system is verified with the original environment. When a
failure trace is reported, this trace is examined to see if it is a
possible trace for the flat system. If this trace is not a possible
trace, then this may be a false negative (note that it may still be a
true failure but a false failure trace). If the failure trace is found
not to be a possible trace, it is necessary to determine which
transformation causes the false negative and rerun the abstraction and verification process without this transformation. This is
accomplished by incrementally backing off transformations that
are known to more likely create a false negative. If false negatives happen rarely, transformations can be used to substantially
reduce the complexity of the analysis.
Calculating the interface behavior of a component’s environment can be conducted by state space exploration to generate
to
all possible timed traces and then applying the function
remove all internal signal transitions from the possible timed
traces. However, state space exploration is an exponential
problem, which is computationally infeasible for large systems.
Instead, internal signal transitions should be removed from
the TPN representing the component’s environment using safe
transformations before state space exploration starts. Since
only safe transformations are utilized, the possible timed traces
produced by the abstracted TPN include the specified interface
behavior. The following lemma proves that the unabstracted
version of the component’s environment conforms to the abstracted version on the same set of interface signal transitions.
This conformance is used to develop a sound methodology for
modular verification discussed in Section VII.
be a TPN, be the set of output tranLemma 5.1: Let
, and
be the set of
sitions in the trace structure
uses only safe
internal transitions. If the function
.
transformations, then
and
be the possible trace sets of
Proof: Let
and
, respectively. From the
. From (1),
definition of safe transformations, we have
. Therefore, from Lemma 4.1, we
we have
.
have
VI. SAFE TRANSFORMATIONS
This section describes the safe transformations used to
remove abstracted transitions from TPNs. Suzuki and Murata

Fig. 7.
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Safe Transformation 1.

[37], [38] present a method of stepwise refinement of transitions and places into subnets. They show a sufficient condition
that such subnets must satisfy which is dependent on the
structure and initial marking of the net. Berthelot [39] presents
several transformations that depend only on the structure of
the net. Murata presents several transformations for marked
graphs in [40]–[42]. All these transformations reduce places
and transitions in the graph, while preserving liveness and
safety properties. These transformations, however, are only
applied to untimed Petri nets. We have developed several safe
transformations for TPN’s. These transformations are safe in
that a TPN after these transformations are applied produces a
superset of timed traces produced by the original net.
Fig. 7 shows Transformation 1 which is applied when an abstracted transition, $, has only a single place in its postset. It
removes the abstracted transition $, and the place in the postset
of $. The timing constraint of the place in the postset of $ is
added to those of the places in the preset of $. Transformation 1
is defined as follows:
Transformation 1: Let $ be an abstracted transition in a TPN
where
,
,
, and either
or
, a new TPN
can be derived from
as
follows:
•
•
•

;
;
where
, and
;

• if
•
•
•
•

then

;
for
for

;

;
;
with $ removed from the domain.

Lemma 6.1: Transformation 1 is a safe transformation.
Proof: To prove this lemma, we need to show that and
produce the same set of untimed traces, and the timing bound
from the place is preserved.
In and , the behavior of transitions , , , and are deproduce the
fined by the environment. To prove that and
same set of untimed traces, we need to show that they produce
the same set of untimed traces in any environment. This requirement allows these transitions to change arbitrarily. Fig. 8 shows
the state diagrams that represent all possible untimed traces proin Fig. 7, respectively. In the state diagrams,
duced by and
s0 and F denote the initial state and failure state of the TPNs.

Authorized licensed use limited to: Brigham Young University. Downloaded on August 16,2010 at 17:12:19 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

1146

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 22, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2003

Consider a timed trace
in which
,
, and
with
,
. The value of falls in the following range:

,
, and

(6)
The value of

comes from the range
(7)

Substituting (6) into (7) yields

(8)
In
(a)
Fig. 8.

State diagrams for (a)

, the value of

comes from the range

(b)

N and (b) N

(a)

(9)

in Fig. 7.

(b)

N

Fig. 9. (a) State diagrams for
after hiding $, and (b) State diagram for (a)
after removing traces which have the prefixes leading to the failure state.

After hiding transition $, states s3 and s4 in Fig. 8(a) are
merged together to become a new state s3_s4 shown in the state
diagram in Fig. 9(a). In the state s3_s4, a transition on , , ,
or can cause to fail or succeed nondeterministically. Since
a trace that can possibly cause a failure is as bad as a trace that
does cause a failure, it is necessary to eliminate all traces from
that also appear in . To accomplish this, we delete states s5
and s6 from the state diagram. We can also remove s7, as it is no
longer reachable. The new state diagram is shown in Fig. 9(b).
By comparing Fig. 9(b) with Fig. 8(b) for , they are the same
proif the labels for the states are ignored. Therefore, and
duce the same set of possible untimed traces on the transitions
.
in

in
This is equivalent to (8), so the ranges of values for
and
are equal. Note that similar results can be obtained for
produce the
other combinations of events. And since and
produces the same set of
same set of untimed traces on ,
on . According to the definition of safe
timed traces as
transformation, Transformation 1 is safe.
Transformation 2 shown in Fig. 10 is applied when the abstracted transition has only a single place in its preset. The following gives the definition of Transformation 2 .
Transformation 2: Let $ be an abstracted transition in a TPN
where
,
,
, and either
or
, a new TPN
can be derived from
as
follows:
;
•
;
•
where
•
, and
;
then
;
• if
for
•
•
for
;
;
•
with $ removed from the domain.
•
Lemma 6.2: Transformation 2 is a safe transformation.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Transformation 1, we can
in Fig. 10 produce the same set of untimed
show that and
traces (proof omitted to save space).
Next, we must show that the timing bound from the place is
in which
,
preserved. Consider a timed trace
,
, and
with
,
,
. The value of falls in the following range:
and
(10)
Given the value of
range

, we can show that

must come from the

(11)
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Fig. 12.
Fig. 10.

Safe Transformation 4.

Safe Transformation 2.

(a)
Fig. 11.
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(b)

(c)

Safe Transformation 3.

After transformation, the value of
can still be drawn from
given the value of must now come
(10), but the value of
from the range

This can be rewritten as follows:

Since
and
, the range of values for
after abstraction is a superset of those before abstraction. Note
that similar results can be shown for other sequences of events
and
produce the same set of untimed
in the net. Since
produces a superset of the timed traces produced by
traces,
. According to the definition of safe transformation, Transformation 2 is safe.
Although Transformation 1 adds no extra behavior, Transformation 2 may create extra timed traces. For example, in Fig. 10,
could generate a trace
,
where is the time when transition fires. This trace is impossible in .
The third transformation involves a merge place and a pair
of abstracted transitions, and it is depicted in Fig. 11(a). Transformation 3 is applied when some abstracted transitions have
the same postset. This transformation merges the pair of abstracted transitions and the places in their preset into a single
abstracted transition and a single place as shown in Fig. 11(b).
At this point, Transformation 1 or Transformation 2 can often
be applied as shown in Fig. 11(c). Like Transformation 2, this
transformation may add additional timing behavior. However, if
and
, then it is an exact transformation. In the

Fig. 13. Environment for Stage1 after removing $ack3+ and $ack3– using
Transformation 1 .

figure, the transitions and can be replaced by a set of transitions feeding a place. Similarly, the transition can be replaced
by a set of transitions coming out of the single place.
The fourth transformation involves a choice place and a pair
of abstracted transitions, and it is depicted in Fig. 12. Similar
and
then it is an exact
to Transformation 3, if
transformation. These two transformations can be proved in a
way similar to that used for Transformations 1 and 2 . Numerous
other safe transformation have been developed and proved to be
correct. More details can be found in [43].
Consider the TPN shown in Fig. 6. The abstracted transitions
$ack3+ and $ack3– can be removed using Transformation 1 resulting in the TPN shown in Fig. 13. Since $x2.f+ and $x2.t+
have the same place in their postsets, they can be merged together. Similarly, $x2.f– and $x2.t– can be merged, too. The
TPN after applying Transformation 3 is shown in Fig. 14. Finally, $x2.t+ and $x2.t– can be removed using Transformation 1
resulting in the final TPN for the environment to Stage1 shown
in Fig. 15. This TPN can now be composed with the TPN for
Stage1 shown in Fig. 3(a), and a timed state space exploration
algorithm can be utilized to determine if Stage1 has any failures.
VII. MODULAR VERIFICATION
This section develops the theory necessary to justify an approach to modular verification that uses safe transformations.
The theory is presented in terms of a circuit composed of two
modules, but it can be readily extended to an arbitrary number of
and
modules. The two modules are described by two TPNs,
, and their corresponding trace structures,
and
. The
and
defines the behavior of the circuit
composition of
which is represented by the trace structure (i.e.,
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is failure-free is used to show that the right-hand side is also
empty.
is failure-free. This means
First, suppose
that its failure set given below is empty

This comes from the definitions of
and composition. Since
, the following is true
(12)

Fig. 14. Environment for Stage1 after removing $x2.f+ and $x2.f– using
Transformation 3.

From (4), a set of traces remains the same if it is applied to by
the inverse delete and then the delete function on the same set
of transitions. Applying this property with the transition set
to , (12) is transformed to
(13)
From (3), a set of traces remains the same after exchanging
the order of the inverse delete and the delete function if
they use disjoint sets of transitions. After applying (3) to
, (13) is transformed to

Fig. 15. Environment for Stage1 after removing $x2.t+ and $x2.t– using
Transformation 1 .

). The possible trace sets of and are denoted by
and
, respectively. Suppose
and
are the sets of internal
signal transitions of and , respectively (i.e.,
and
). The composition of
and
is only
defined when the outputs of the two modules are disjoint (i.e.,
). This implies that the internal signal transition
).
sets are also disjoint (i.e.,
The theory in this section allows us to verify the complete
circuit by verifying each module individually. If both modules
are correct, the complete circuit is also correct. When verifying
is regarded as the environment
the module , the module
for . Therefore, the internal signal transitions of can be removed and the result of the verification is not affected. When
is chosen, a similar process is applied to . The idea is formulated in the following theorem.
and
be internal signal transition sets
Theorem 7.1: Let
is failure-free
of and , respectively. If
is failure-free, then
is
and
also failure-free.
can be found from
Proof: First, the failure set of
the definition of composition

Now both sides of the intersection operator have the delete funcis extracted using (5), then we can
tion in the front. If
determine the following:

Since a subset of the empty set is also an empty set, the following
holds:
(14)
Finally, from (2), if the delete function is applied to an empty
set, the resulting set is still empty, and vice versa. Therefore,
from (14), we have the following:
after removing
(15)
This proves the first half of the theorem. Now, we prove the
is failure-free. Thus,
second half. Suppose
its failure set is

By applying the same steps above to the following:

where
and
.
is empty.
To prove this theorem, we must show that
This is achieved by using the fact that
is failure-free to show that the left-hand side of the union
operator is empty. Similarly, the fact that

we can derive the following:
(16)
The union of (15) and (16) is the failure set of
(15) and (16) are empty, the failure set of

. Since both
is also
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empty. This theorem is naturally extended to a circuit consisting
of more than two modules.
Determining if
and
are failure-free is still an exponential problem, since the
operator requires all the traces to be first derived then
transitions are deleted from them. To address this problem, our
method instead applies abstraction and safe transformations to
the corresponding TPN to remove internal signal transitions,
then the state space is explored to generate the new trace
structure. Given a TPN and its corresponding trace structure
, from Lemma 5.1 we know that
conforms to
(see Definition 4.1). Suppose
and
are
and , respectively. Therefore, combined
the TPNs for
conforms
with Lemma 4.2, we know that
and
conforms
to
. Using these observations, we can
prove the key result of this paper.
and
be internal signal transition
Theorem 7.2: Let
and , respectively. If
is
sets of
is failure-free, then
failure-free, and
is also failure-free.
Proof: From Lemma 5.1, we have

From Lemma 4.2, we have

Since
and
failure-free, then
are failure-free. From Theorem 7.1,

are
and
is failure-free.

VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have incorporated our abstraction technique into our specification compiler [44] front-end to the ATACS tool. When verifying a system, it is supplied to ATACS with its environment,
and the user indicates a component in the system to be verified. Before state space exploration, ATACS finds the environment for the component and the internal signals in the environment based on the interface of the component and removes as
many transitions on those signals as possible using the abstraction technique described above. This process is repeated for all
components in the system which have not been verified. The
default is that all safe transformations introduced in Section VI
are applied. However, the user can restrict the transformations
to avoid a false negative. This section describes the application
of our method to three timed circuit benchmarks. BAP, an enhanced version of the POSET timing analysis algorithm [45] is
used as the underlying timing analysis engine for all examples
in this section.
The first example is a multiple stage controller for a selftimed FIFO from Sun Microsystems. In [46], a highly optimized
hand designed timed circuit implementation is presented. The

1149

Fig. 16. (a) Control circuit for a single stage FIFO and (b) runtime result for
a FIFO up to six stages.

circuit is shown in Fig. 16(a). The operation of the FIFO is as follows: whenever a stage that is Full is followed by a stage that is
Empty, the data in the full stage is moved to the empty stage and
the states of both stages are changed correspondingly. When a
request comes in (FIN+) and the FIFO is empty (EOUT is high),
the data is latched (En_bar+ and En–). In parallel, the insertion
is acknowledged (SEOUT–) and the next stage is requested to
accept the data (FOUT+). When the next stage accepts the data
(SEIN–), the FIFO is set to be empty (EOUT+) and the latch is
opened (En_bar– and En+).
The correctness of this circuit is highly dependent on timing
parameters. We assume a delay of 90 to 110 time units for each
gate. We assume that FIN+ transitions on the far left side of the
FIFO can arrive anytime after 180 time units from the SEOUT+
transition, which is initially enabled. The transition FIN– occurs
between 180 and 260 time units after SEOUT–. The transition
SEIN– on the far right side goes low anytime after 90 time units
from the FOUT+ transition, while SEIN+ occurs 90 to 110 time
units after FOUT–. Without using abstraction, ATACS can only
analyze a FIFO with up to four stages. For the FIFO with five
stages, we had to kill the process after it ran for over a day.
With abstraction on, however, ATACS easily proceeds to 100
stages. The verification at 100 stages takes approximately 31
min and 13 MB of memory. Fig. 16(b) shows the comparative
runtime results up to four stages. The runtimes are taken from
a 650-MHz Pentium III with 576 MB of memory. This same
machine is used to generate all results in the remainder of this
presentation.
The second example is the STARI communication circuit presented earlier and described in detail in [31]. In [27], the authors state that COSPAN, which uses a region technique for
timing verification [47], ran out of memory attempting to verify
a three-stage gate-level version of STARI on a machine with 1
GB of memory. This paper goes on to describe an abstract model
developed by hand for STARI for which they could verify eight
stages in 92.4 MB of memory and 1.67 h. Our automated abstraction method verifies a 15-stage STARI with a maximum
memory usage of 32 MB of memory for a single stage in just
over 27 min. Fig. 17 shows the comparative runtimes for verification with and without abstraction on STARI. As shown in the
chart, BAP can verify STARI with up to 12 stages using 197 MB
of memory in about 15.5 min. In the first few stages, the runtime
for verification with abstraction is worse because abstraction itself takes time. The figure shows the runtime for flat analysis in
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Fig. 19.

Fig. 17.

Runtimes for STARI.

(a)
Fig. 18.

(b)

Different implementations of STARI.

BAP to increase at a higher rate than the comparative runtime
of BAP with abstraction in this example.
It is important to note that our approach is not constrained to a
particular state space search algorithm. This is key because the
abstraction method can be used in conjunction with any analysis algorithm. In [48], for example, an analysis algorithm is
presented that can verify STARI up to 18 stages. If we used this
analysis algorithm, then we would likely see improvement over
our current results.
An interesting by-product of our approach on STARI is that
the modular verification leads to circuit optimization. A traditional approach designs and verifies a single STARI stage
and replicates it up to the desired size of the FIFO. An implementation of a STARI stage using the timing numbers in
Fig. 4 is shown in Fig. 18(a). A STARI consisting of this stage
implementation is verified correct. However, different implementations of STARI satisfying the same timing properties are
available. These alternate implementations are discovered by
the modular analysis. In an eight-stage STARI, for example, the
C-elements in the first three stages used to store the data can be
reduced to wires as shown in Fig. 18(b). In the last three stages,
a generalized C-element using one less transistor can be used.
Only the middle two stages require full C-elements. 80 literals
and 160 transistors are required to implement an eight-stage
STARI consisting of the same stages, while the second implementation requires 56 literals and 136 transistors. This example

RAPPID microarchitecture.

shows that verification using abstraction can help identify the
redundant components in a circuit and simplify the design.
The last example comes from Intel’s RAPPID circuit. The
goal of this example is to demonstrate the application of
our method on a timed circuit with irregular structures. The
RAPPID circuit is a fully asynchronous instruction-length
decoder for the Pentium II 32-bit MMX instruction set. In
this instruction set, each instruction can be from 1 to 15 bytes
long, depending on a large number of factors. In order to
allow concurrent execution of instructions, it is necessary to
rapidly determine the positions of each instruction in a cache
line. Instruction-length decoding was a critical performance
bottleneck in the Pentium II architecture at the time when
RAPPID was being designed.
The RAPPID microarchitecture is shown in Fig. 19. The
RAPPID decoder reads in a 16-byte cache line, and it decodes
each byte as if it is the first byte of a new instruction. Each
byte speculatively determines the length of an instruction
beginning with this byte. The actual first byte of the current
instruction is marked with a tag. This byte uses the length that
it determined to decide which byte is the first byte of the next
instruction. It then signals that byte while notifying all bytes
in between to cancel their length calculations and forward the
bytes of the current instruction to an output buffer. To improve
performance, four rows of tag units and output buffers are used
in a round-robin four-issue fashion.
The RAPPID design achieved a significant performance improvement over its synchronous counterpart using circuits that
are aggressively optimized through timing assumptions. For example, the tag unit circuit shown in Fig. 20 requires timing assumptions for correct operation. In typical asynchronous communication, a request is transmitted followed by an acknowledge being received to indicate that the circuit can reset. In this
case, there is no explicit acknowledgment, but rather, acknowledgment comes by way of a timing assumption. Once a tag arrives (i.e., TagArrived is high), if the instruction and steering
switch are ready (i.e., InstRdy and SSRdy are high), then the
course is set to begin to reset TagArrived. The result is that
is a pulse. The shape of the
the signal produced on
pulse must be carefully controlled for the circuit to
operate correctly.
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TABLE I
RESULTS FOR RAPPID EXAMPLE

Fig. 20.

Tag unit circuit.

(a)

(b)

Fig. 22. Reason for false negatives in PEi units.

Fig. 21.

Block diagram for the RAPPID control circuit.

In this example, we analyze a somewhat simplified, although
still nonregular, version of the control portion for a column of
the RAPPID circuit depicted in Fig. 21. It is simplified in that
signals which would preempt this column have not been incorporated. Data has also been abstracted away as modeling the
length calculation using a Petri net would certainly be quite
complex, and it is sufficient to represent this using nondeterminism.
The complexity of this simplified model of a column from
RAPPID is significant. The TPN description of the column has
115 transitions on 49 signal wires. Flat analysis runs out of
memory in about an hour on our test machine (the stack depth
was in excess of 27 000 entries and climbing indicating that it

had a long way to go). Our approach considers each of the major
control modules individually: TU, AG, BC, and IR. The results
of the analysis are shown in Table I. The TU, AG, and BC units
are rapidly verified within a minute of total runtime for all three
modules. The IR module is further decomposed into seven mod) generate the Preules due to its size. Modules (
empt signals, and module IR1 generates the InstRdy signal. The
analysis of all 10 modules requires 16 runs, which on average,
reduce the TPN by over half. The entire analysis also explores
on average less than 1600 timed states and 1000 untimed states,
and uses under 20 megabytes of memory per verification run.
The total analysis time is less than 11 minutes for this example.
The reason that each of the PEi units are run twice is because
the first analysis run finds a false negative. The introduction of
the false negative can be illustrated using a snippet of the TPN
model before and after applying a transformation as shown in
Fig. 22(a) and (b). Before the transformation [see Fig. 22(a)] it
is clear that the only possible trace of visible signal transitions is:
, TagAck–.
must
TagAck+,
occur within 330 time units after $Len3+, while TagAck– cannot
occur until at least 720 time units after $Len3+. After Transformation 2 removes $Len3+ [see Fig. 22(b)], however, the trace
is introduced. This adTagAck+, TagAck–,
ditional trace eventually results in a failure in our model. After
obtaining a false negative, we rerun the abstraction and analysis
without using Transformation 2. Although more transitions remain in the net to be analyzed (54 as opposed to 43 in this case),
the analysis time for both runs is still less than 25 s.
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A final point to mention regarding the results for the analysis
of RAPPID is that the runtimes include more than the cost of
state space exploration. The reported runtimes are a composite
of state space exploration, correctness checking, and synthesis
to generate a circuit implementation for the module under analysis. The modular approach described in this paper is not limited
to verification, but can be also applied to improving synthesis
time for timed circuits. State based synthesis relies critically on
state space exploration. In all cases, the synthesized circuit is
either the same as that reported for RAPPID (such as the one
shown in Fig. 20) or a version appropriate to the simplifying assumptions described earlier.
IX. CONCLUSION
Since the size of state space grows exponentially in the size
of a design, state explosion is the most serious challenge for any
verification method based on state space exploration. This paper
describes a theoretical framework and techniques to avoid state
space explosion encountered in large designs by partitioning a
design into modules with constrained complexity and verifying
each module separately. This paper proves that the entire design
can be shown to be correct if each of its constituent modules is
correct. An abstraction technique is described to construct the
environment for each module, and the concept of safe transformations is used to derive an abstraction for that environment.
This paper also presents several transformations that are proven
to satisfy the requirement of safe transformations.
We have performed case studies on three examples including
an industrial scale design. Our results are promising and show
that our abstraction method is faster and uses less memory than
flat analysis for these designs. This enables the verification of
systems that are beyond the reach of flat analysis. We have also
shown that although false negative results are possible, they
are rare in our case studies. Moreover, an incremental back off
from the applied transformations can be efficiently implemented
to remove false negatives. Another important point is that our
method can be built on top of any reachability analysis algorithm. If some better reachability analysis algorithm is available, then it can be combined with our abstraction method to
extend capacity to even larger designs. In particular, our preliminary analysis has shown that combining abstraction with a
partial order based analysis technique can bring even further improvements.
Currently, our method requires indication from users to select
modules to verify. In the future, we plan to develop a partition
approach to automatically break a design into a set of modules
each with optimal complexity. We are also looking at methods to
better treat false negatives. In the current approach, when verification fails, we rerun the analysis by incrementally undoing the
transformations until we establish the truthfulness of the violation. The current implementation is brute force. In the future, we
would like to develop techniques to automatically analyze the
result and determine which transformation causes the failure.
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